Topic: Military History
(For clarity, Austro-Hungarian units are rendered in italics.)
Though Germany had scored a notable victory in East Prussia, it was severely tempered if not negated by the disaster that engulfed the armies of the Habsburg Monarchy in Galicia.
It will be remembered that a prewar agreement between the German and Austro-Hungarian general staffs had provided for an Austrian offensive—this to relieve the pressure on the scanty German forces defending East Prussia. Such an offensive would necessitate the deployment of the bulk of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Galicia, leaving minimal forces to screen Serbia. But the Austrian Chief of Staff, General Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, was ill content with this arrangement. Though Russia posed a serious military threat, he and most leading figures of the Habsburg Monarchy viewed Serbia’s pan-Slavic aspirations as an even greater menace. The Serbs’ desire to unite the south Slavs in a single kingdom under their leadership implied the demise of the Monarchy. Thus Conrad was determined to “strike down Serbia with rapid blows” at the beginning of the war, notwithstanding his agreement with the Germans.
How Conrad’s duplicity made a muddle of Austrian mobilization has already been related. The fate of his Serbian offensive can be sketched in a few words. Attacking on 12 August, the Fifth and Sixth Armies made good initial progress. The Austrian commander, Feldzeugmeister (General of Artillery) Oskar Potiorek imagined that his troops would easily rout the primitive and ill-equipped Serbs. His confidence was badly misplaced. It was true that the Serbian Army was short of weapons and even boots for its soldiers, but it was a battle-hardened force under a skilled and redoubtable commander, General Radomir Putnik. In the face of the advancing Austrians he withdrew and concentrated his army in anticipation of a counterattack. This was launched on 15 August against Fifth Army and after fierce fighting with heavy casualties on both sides the Austrians were compelled to withdraw. By 20 August Fifth Army had been chased entirely out of Serbia—a painful setback for a country that still counted itself a great power. Further fighting in August and into September produced no better results, even witnessing a Serbian advance into Austrian Bosnia. The debacle being complete, Potiorek was relieved of command.
This humiliating defeat, bad enough in and of itself, was parlous in its effect on Austrian fortunes in Galicia. Conrad, it will be recalled, had initially thought to stand on the defensive there, well inside the frontier, while Serbia was dealt with. To that end his strategic reserve, B-Staffel (Second Army), was directed against Serbia. But when Conrad changed his mind and ordered an offensive in Galicia, it was too late to modify Second Army’s orders: It would have to go to the Serbian front anyway, there to await the clearance of the rail lines. In the event the army was partly drawn into the Serbian invasion and, thanks to the ill success of the Austrian offensive, when the time came to move north one-third of it (IV Corps with three divisions) had to be left behind. Thus Second Army arrived in Galicia both late and under strength.
While Conrad’s operations in Serbia were proceeding on their lamentable course, the main body of the Austro-Hungarian Army, A-Staffel with some 30 infantry divisions and 8 cavalry divisions, was being deployed in Galicia. From left to right, these forces were allotted to the First, Fourth and Third Armies. By late August they had completed their march to the frontier (necessitated by Conrad’s earlier decision to stand on the defensive inside Galicia) and were ready to attack. Conrad’s plan, sound enough in principle, was to advance north-east into Russian Poland with the two armies of his left wing. But thanks to Second Army’s non-appearance, the forces at his disposal were insufficient. As First and Fourth Armies advanced, the right flank of the latter would be increasingly bared. Third Army on the right was given the mission—it proved to be a mission impossible—of screening this flank. As Conrad was all too well aware, Russian mobilization would inevitably bring more and more divisions into the line against the Austrian armies. And thanks to Second Army’s late arrival, the resultant pressure on the Austrian right flank would soon bring about a crisis.
Nevertheless Conrad persisted and the general Austro-Hungarian offensive in Galicia commenced on 22 August 1914.
