Topic: Military History
(Note: For clarity, German formations are rendered in italics.)
The first campaign of the Great War in the west was dominated by two factors: Germany’s amended Schlieffen Plan (already described) and France’s Plan XVII. The latter was a straightforward proposition: a mobilization and deployment scheme anticipating an all-out offensive, the objective of which was to clear German forces from Alsace and Lorraine and carry the French armies to the Rhine River. For this purpose France’s five field armies were to be concentrated between the Belgian and Swiss borders. On the left, Fifth Army was to act as a flank guard in case the Germans attempted an attack through Luxembourg and southern Belgium. The remaining armies—from left to right the Fourth, Third, Second and First—were to drive into Lorraine. To the south of this main effort, a detached corps would advance into Alsace.
Though the French commander, General Joseph Joffre, recognized the possibility of a German flank attack through southern Belgium he never seriously considered the idea of a large-scale German maneuver on the pattern of the Schlieffen Plan. Joffre reasoned that the Germans possessed insufficient first-line divisions for such an audacious operation. Discounting the value of his own reserve divisions, he failed to foresee that the Germans would use theirs in an offensive role. Thus the Fifth Army, supplemented by the four infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade of the British Expeditionary Force (Field Marshal Sir John French), seemed to him adequate to secure the French left flank. Farther north along the Franco-Belgian border there was to be nothing more than a thin screen of second-line Territorial troops.
This strategic misjudgment was compounded by serious tactical deficiencies. In the years prior to the war the French Army had fallen under the sway of a faction that preached the doctrine of the offensive in its most extreme form. All professional soldiers in Europe felt similarly, of course, but in France the offensive was embraced with almost religious fervor. Relying on an aggressive spirit supposedly native to the French soldier, the armies would plunge ahead in dense formations, supported by the rapid fire of the excellent French 75mm field gun, overrunning the enemy in one audacious rush.
There were, indeed, doubters and critics. Some argued that insufficient attention had been paid to infantry tactics or to the problems of coordination between infantry and artillery. Others pointed to the French Army’s lack of medium and heavy field artillery. These criticisms the prophets of the offensive waved away with assurances that French cran—guts—would compensate for any such minor shortcomings. To suggestions that the traditional infantry uniform—dark blue coat, madder red trousers—should be replaced by something less obtrusive, they replied scornfully: Les pantalons rouges, ils sont la France!
Given this background, what happened when Joffre launched his offensive may readily be inferred. Between 14 and 23 August the French armies were bloodily repulsed at all points in Lorraine. Attacking in close-packed formations, bayonets fixed, regimental colors and saber-waving officers in front—sometimes even with bands playing—the French infantry was mowed down in droves by rifle, machinegun and artillery fire. Against German troops in well-sited defensive positions the fire of the 75mm field gun proved ineffective. Only in Alsace, where the defending Germans were weakest, did the French enjoy some measure of success—but the ground gained there was mostly yielded back after the disasters in Lorraine and the Ardennes.
Preoccupied with the fortunes of his attacking armies Joffre was slow to recognize the danger looming on his left flank. The information that did come to hand convinced him that the Germans were attempting no more than the anticipated flank attack through southern Belgium. He therefore ordered Fifth Army to sidestep to its left, establishing touch with the BEF, now in the field with four infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. The Third and Fourth Armies were called upon to advance into the Ardennes, there to blunt the German advance. But as in Lorraine the French attack broke down amid heavy casualties.
Meanwhile the German right wing, consisting of First, Second and Third Armies, was advancing through Belgium. Brussels fell on 20 August. After a hard-fought battle at Mons on 23 August the BEF was pressed steadily back by First Army. Fifth Army found itself confronted, badly outnumbered and driven back by Second Army and Third Army. This heavy pressure on the French left also forced the Fourth Army to give ground. The Battle of the Frontiers was over, a grievous and costly French defeat, and the Great Retreat was underway.
But not all was well on the German side. At the headquarters of OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung or Army High Command) in Trier, General von Moltke fretted. His armies had done well thus far but where were the spoils of decisive victory: prisoners, captured guns and impedimenta? What was happening at the front? As the field armies advanced, communications between them and OHL became fitful and uncertain. And from the east, where a mere fraction of the German Army stood in defense of East Prussia, there came grim tidings of a massive Russian offensive. As the terrible uncertainties accumulated, the nerves of the Chief of the Great General Staff began steadily to fray.
(To be continued)