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					The 
					Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor not only precipitated the 
					United States into World War II but fixed the nation’s 
					attention on the Pacific Ocean. The first six months of 
					America's war, from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (7 
					December 1941) to the Battle of Midway (4-7 June 1942) 
					brought with them an unmitigated tale of disaster and 
					defeat. Though Germany’s declaration of war on the United 
					States came on 11 December, Wake Island, the Philippines, 
					the Battle of the Java Sea, dominated the news.
					
					But 
					long-term strategic considerations dictated that the Pacific 
					would become a secondary theater of war. The Arcadia 
					Conference (22 December 1941-14 January 1942) was the first 
					wartime meeting of the Western Allies, America and Britain. 
					Arcadia set the template for the coordination of the two 
					nations’ military effort, and its most important strategic 
					decision was that the defeat of Germany must be given first 
					priority.
					
					“Germany 
					first” demanded a buildup of US military 
					forces in the United Kingdom, looking forward to an invasion 
					of France and a subsequent ground campaign in northwest Europe. 
					This buildup was code-named BOLERO and to facilitate it a US 
					Army headquarters was established in Britain: United States 
					Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), later European 
					Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). The air 
					component of BOLERO called for a US Army Air Forces (USAAF) 
					deployment of 3,649 aircraft to the UK by March 1943. The 
					USAAF deployment had two objectives: to ensure that 
					sufficient air support for an invasion of continental Europe 
					would be available, and to establish on British soil a force 
					of heavy, long-range bombers capable of conducting a 
					strategic air offensive against Germany.
					
					Unlike 
					the RAF, the American air force was not an independent 
					branch of the armed forces. The Air Corps remained part of 
					the Army, though with the establishment of Headquarters, 
					United States Army Air Forces on 20 June 1941, the airmen 
					gained a considerable measure of autonomy. For the 
					duration of the war they shelved their drive to secure for 
					the air force co-equal status with the Army and Navy. But 
					they were well aware that the USAAF’s performance in the war 
					would determine the future of their service.
					
					As in 
					Britain, the American airmen based their case for 
					independence on a claim to primacy in future wars. Air 
					power, striking directly at the enemy’s industrial 
					infrastructure, would be strategically decisive, relegating 
					the other armed forces to secondary roles. In the interwar 
					years, the American version of this strategic air power 
					doctrine came to be based on the concept of daylight 
					precision bombing. And in early 1942 as the air deployment 
					to the UK got underway, the USAAF believed it had the 
					weapons and technology necessary to make that concept 
					effective.
 
					
					
					
					
					The first B-17: Boeing's Model 299 (The 
					Boeing Company)
					
					The 
					prototype Flying Fortress—Boeing's Model 299—made its first 
					flight on 28 July 1935 and demonstrated such potential that 
					despite its later loss in an accident an Air Corps order for 
					thirteen improved YB-17s followed in 1936. These aircraft 
					were used for test and evaluation purposes pending Air Corps 
					adoption of the type. Once declared operational the YB-17 
					was redesignated as the B-17A. Ten more with detail 
					improvements, designated B-17B, were ordered in 1937 with 
					the intention of establishing two heavy bombardment groups, 
					one on each US coast. In July 1940 an additional 512 B-17s 
					were ordered and by 7 December 1941 there were some 200 in 
					USAAF service.
					
					As to be 
					expected with such a technologically advanced aircraft, the 
					early B-17s exhibited various teething troubles. Twenty 
					B-17Cs were provided to the RAF via Lend-Lease but due to 
					inadequate crew training, maintenance problems, and design 
					flaws they proved disappointing in service. One major weak 
					spot was the defensive armament. None of the B-17C’s five 
					machine guns were mounted in power-operated turrets, they 
					were prone to jamming, and there was no tail gun. 
					Fortunately, however, Boeing had been at work on a major 
					redesign, and this became the B-17E. It had a new tail 
					assembly for improved flight stability, a tail turret with 
					twin caliber .50 machine guns, power-operated dorsal and 
					ventral turrets with the same armament, and numerous other 
					improvements. The B-17E was the first mass-produced version 
					of the Flying Fortress. Over 500 were built and it was 
					followed by the B-17F with further improvements. Between 
					mid-1942 and late 1943, these two models equipped most of 
					the USAAF heavy bombardment groups in the UK.
					
					Pinpoint 
					bombing performance was to be assured by the top-secret 
					Norden Mk. XV tachometric bombsight. 
					The Norden employed an analog computer that 
					recalculated the bomb impact point based on changing flight 
					conditions, coupled to an autopilot that that made rapid and 
					accurate course corrections. Together, these features 
					promised unprecedented accuracy for daytime bombing from 
					high altitudes. In prewar tests the Norden achieved a 
					circular error probable (CEP) of 75 feet, meaning that it 
					could place bombs within a circle of that diameter. The Air 
					Corps believed that the Norden would enable heavy bombers to 
					make precision attacks on such targets as ships and 
					factories from high altitude.
			 
					
					
					
					
					Major General Carl Spaatz 
					(left), commanding Eighth Air Force, and Brigadier General 
					Ira Eaker, commanding VIII Bomber Command (US War 
					Department)
					
					The 
					USAAF formation that would conduct the strategic air 
					offensive against Germany, the storied Eighth Air Force, was 
					activated on 28 January 1942 at Savannah Army Air Base, 
					Georgia. The Eighth was not originally earmarked for 
					Britain; it was to be the air component of Operation 
					GYMNAST, the proposed invasion of North Africa. When this 
					was postponed (later to be revived as TORCH in November 
					1942), it was decided that the Eighth would go to Britain 
					instead. There, the groundwork for a major deployment of 
					American airpower was being laid by Brigadier General Ira C. 
					Eaker, the commander-designate of VIII Bomber Command. He and a small staff 
					had arrived in Britain on 8 February 1942 and immediately 
					set about the gargantuan task of creating the infrastructure 
					necessary to support a strategic air force.
					
					In 
					this the Americans were greatly assisted by the RAF. The 
					cooperation between the allied air forces is one of the 
					outstanding success stories of World War II, and in those 
					early days the RAF was unstinting in its support of the 
					fledgling American effort. Eaker established excellent 
					relations with Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the 
					Chief of the Air Staff, and with Air Marshal Sir Arthur 
					Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command. They saw to 
					it that the Americans were provided with everything from 
					billets and rations to clerical, maintenance and 
					communications support pending the establishment of the USAAF logistical base. To prepare for the reception of the 
					Eighth Air Force, 127 airfields, either already in existence 
					or to be constructed, were identified. Seventy-five of these 
					were earmarked for the Eighth’s heavy bombardment groups.
 
					
					
					
					Distinguishing Flag of the 
					Eighth Air Force
					
					The 
					group, consisting of a headquarters squadron and three 
					flying squadrons with eight, later twelve, aircraft each was 
					the USAAF’s basic unit. In Britain, each heavy bombardment 
					group would be allotted a primary and a satellite airfield. 
					Sixty-six of these were to be ready by March 1943. For the 
					initial American deployment, eight airfields already under 
					construction for the RAF were made available.
					
					
					While these preparations in Britain were underway, the 
					Eighth Air Force was being reorganized for its new mission 
					and prepared for deployment. This was the responsibility of 
					Major General Carl Spaatz, the commander of the Eighth since 
					5 May 1942. The Eighth’s major subordinate units were VIII 
					Bomber Command, VIII Fighter Command, VIII Composite Command 
					(responsible for training) and VIII Service Command 
					(responsible for logistics). A large number of combat units 
					were listed for future assignment to the Eighth, but 
					initially it had only the 1st and 31st Pursuit Groups, the 
					97th Bombardment Group (Heavy) and the separate 5th Photo 
					Reconnaissance Squadron. Later two more pursuit groups—by 
					then redesignated as fighter groups—and two more heavy 
					bombardment groups were added.
			 
					
					
					
					
					Early production P-38 fighters like these 
					equipped two of the Eighth Air Force's four initial fighter 
					groups (US Air Force History & Museums Program)
					
					The 
					ground echelon of the Eighth moved to Britain mostly by sea, 
					but the aircraft themselves flew directly from the US. There 
					were three routes, all originating from Presque Isle, Maine, 
					with intermediate stops at Goose Bay, Labrador, Gander, 
					Newfoundland, Greenland or Iceland. Despite the perils of 
					such long flights, especially for fighter aircraft, the 
					movement was completed successfully with only 5% losses—half 
					what had been forecast. By August 1942 386 aircraft—164 
					P-38s, 119 B-17s, and 103 C-47s—had arrived in Britain. Only 
					the two fighter groups equipped with P-39s did not fly their 
					aircraft across the Atlantic; such a flight was considered 
					too dangerous for the single-engine Airacobra. Instead, the 
					two groups were provisionally equipped with Spitfires upon 
					their arrival in Britain.
					
					So the Americans 
					arrived: in small numbers initially, and it would be some 
					time before the first units were ready for combat. Aircrew 
					required additional training and familiarization with 
					European conditions, the Eighth Air Force’s ground 
					organization had to be perfected, there were thousands of 
					details, from high priority to trivial, that demanded 
					attention. This was the work done by General Eaker and his 
					staff between February and August of 1942, and it set the 
					stage for the assembly of a mighty aerial host.
					
					
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