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The 1943-45 tank corps was
considerably larger than those
originally formed in early 1942, having
gradually acquired a number of additional units. Prominent
among these were self-propelled artillery (armored assault
gun) regiments. Usually there were three such regiments
assigned: one light, one medium and one heavy. Sometimes the
heavy SP assault gun regiment was replaced by a heavy tank
regiment. Also added was a light field artillery regiment
(76.2mm guns), an antiaircraft artillery regiment, a rocket
launcher battalion and an engineer battalion—all motorized.
Overall, therefore, the tank corps
became similar in structure to the
mechanized corps, albeit
with three tank brigades and a motorized rifle brigade
versus three mechanized brigades and one tank brigade. The
tank corps had around 12,000 men while the mechanized corps
had around 17,500, a difference largely accounted for by the
stronger infantry contingent of the latter.
By 1943 the tank brigades of the
tank corps were predominantly equipped with the T-34 tank;
the self-propelled assault gun regiments had various SU and
JSU models armed with an 85mm, 100mm, 122mm or 152mm gun.
The heavy tank regiment, when present, was at first equipped
with KV-series tanks and later with the powerful JS-series
tanks, armed with a 122mm gun. In late 1942-early 1943 most
tank brigades had two battalions, for a total of 42 tanks,
but the desired standard was three (63 tanks total) and by
mid-1943 most tank brigades assigned to tank corps had
reached this strength. The numerous separate tank brigades
mostly remained at a strength of two tank battalions and
some were equipped with Lend-Lease British and American
tanks such as the Valentine and the Sherman.
Beginning in 1943, the motorized
rifle battalions of the tank brigades were converted into
motorized submachine gun battalions. The had two companies
armed predominantly with submachine guns—one motorized, one
tank rider—and a motorized rifle company plus antitank,
mortar and antiaircraft machine gun companies. The
battalions of the motorized rifle brigade were also
reconfigured, with a larger allotment of submachine guns.
Troops of a motorized
rifle battalion riding in British Universal Carriers (Imperial War Museum)
All these extra units and new
weapons considerably augmented the combat power of the tank
corps but it was still deficient in field artillery. By
1943, however, the Red Army had evolved an operational
doctrine that accounted for this deficiency. The basic
operational unit for mobile forces was the tank army,
usually with two tank corps, a mechanized corps and an array
of support units. The tank army was used offensively to
exploit gaps opened in the enemy’s defenses by the rifle
divisions and the artillery, driving
forward to seize key terrain and objectives. Defensively,
the tank army was employed to deliver counterattacks against
attacking enemy forces, if possible converting these to a
full counteroffensive.
The late-war tank corps was remarkably
similar to the US Army's
1943 light armored division.
The latter's three tank
battalions had roughly the strength of the former's tank
brigades and the total infantry strength of the two units
was also about the same, given the smaller size of the Red
Army's motorized rifle battalions. The main difference
between the two units was that the tank corps had a much
weaker artillery component consisting of motor-towed 76mm
guns and 120mm mortars, whereas the US division had three
battalions of armored self-propelled 105mm howitzers.
Besides the tank corps and the
mechanized corps, the Red Army had one other mobile unit:
the cavalry corps. The cavalry arm had always enjoyed a
certain prestige that dated from the Civil War (1918-21) and
the Polish-Soviet War (1919-21). In Eastern Europe and the
USSR, where good roads were few and there was much rough
much terrain, the horse was a useful and sometimes superior
mode of transportation. At the beginning of the war in 1941
the Red Army had five cavalry corps and a few independent cavalry
divisions.
The 1941 cavalry corps was
organized with two divisions and various support units. As
was often the case with Red Army formations, designations
were deceptive. With around 4,500 men, the cavalry divisions
were really the size of brigades; the cavalry corps was the
size of a division. By 1943 there were three divisions in a
cavalry corps, along with one or two tank regiments, a light
self-propelled assault gun regiment and various support
units, for a total of some 18,000 men. They were usually committed to action
in sectors were the terrain was challenging for motor
vehicles. Tactically the
cavalry functioned as mounted infantry, moving on horseback
and fighting on foot. However, the troopers were armed with
sabers and sometimes conducted mounted attacks in the
traditional cavalry style.
Red Army cavalry charging
with the saber (World War Photos)
Late in the war a cavalry corps was
sometimes combined with a mechanized corps to form a
cavalry-mechanized group. This operational-level formation,
usually named after its commander, was set up on an
as-needed basis using formations held in reserve by a front
(army group). Its function was to penetrate deep into the
enemy’s rear area following a successful breakthrough. Such
operations could be perilous, as the Germans could be
counted on to react energetically to any such threat. During
the Battle of Debrecen (Hungary, October 1944) the
Cavalry-Mechanized Group Pliyev was badly mauled, and though
escaping destruction lost most of its tanks and other
vehicles.
The odds being roughly equal, the
Germans could rely on gaining the upper hand in a clash
between their panzer forces and the Red Army’s mobile
forces—thanks mostly to superior staff work, greater
tactical flexibility and better cooperation between
artillery, tanks and mechanized infantry. But by the end of
1943 the odds were no longer equal. More than two years of
intensive combat and high casualties had precipitated the
German Army into a manpower crisis from which it was never
to recover. And though the Red Army could not hope to match
its enemy’s level of tactical and operational expertise, it
had succeeded in creating powerful mobile forces that made
the most of the resources, human and material, that the
Soviet state could supply.
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