♦ Enter the Americans ♦

The Theory & Practice of Strategic Bombing 1914-45
 

 

An early production B-17E, the type that conducted the Eighth Air Force's initial combat missions in 1942  (US Air Force History & Museums Program)
 


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The Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor not only precipitated the United States into World War II but fixed the nation’s attention on the Pacific Ocean. The first six months of America's war, from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) to the Battle of Midway (4-7 June 1942) brought with them an unmitigated tale of disaster and defeat. Though Germany’s declaration of war on the United States came on 11 December, Wake Island, the Philippines, the Battle of the Java Sea, dominated the news.

But long-term strategic considerations dictated that the Pacific would become a secondary theater of war. The Arcadia Conference (22 December 1941-14 January 1942) was the first wartime meeting of the Western Allies, America and Britain. Arcadia set the template for the coordination of the two nations’ military effort, and its most important strategic decision was that the defeat of Germany must be given first priority.

“Germany first” demanded a buildup of US military forces in the United Kingdom, looking forward to an invasion of France and a subsequent ground campaign in northwest Europe. This buildup was code-named BOLERO and to facilitate it a US Army headquarters was established in Britain: United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), later European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA). The air component of BOLERO called for a US Army Air Forces (USAAF) deployment of 3,649 aircraft to the UK by March 1943. The USAAF deployment had two objectives: to ensure that sufficient air support for an invasion of continental Europe would be available, and to establish on British soil a force of heavy, long-range bombers capable of conducting a strategic air offensive against Germany.

Unlike the RAF, the American air force was not an independent branch of the armed forces. The Air Corps remained part of the Army, though with the establishment of Headquarters, United States Army Air Forces on 20 June 1941, the airmen gained a considerable measure of autonomy. For the duration of the war they shelved their drive to secure for the air force co-equal status with the Army and Navy. But they were well aware that the USAAF’s performance in the war would determine the future of their service.

As in Britain, the American airmen based their case for independence on a claim to primacy in future wars. Air power, striking directly at the enemy’s industrial infrastructure, would be strategically decisive, relegating the other armed forces to secondary roles. In the interwar years, the American version of this strategic air power doctrine came to be based on the concept of daylight precision bombing. And in early 1942 as the air deployment to the UK got underway, the USAAF believed it had the weapons and technology necessary to make that concept effective.
 

The first B-17: Boeing's Model 299 (The Boeing Company)

The prototype Flying Fortress—Boeing's Model 299—made its first flight on 28 July 1935 and demonstrated such potential that despite its later loss in an accident an Air Corps order for thirteen improved YB-17s followed in 1936. These aircraft were used for test and evaluation purposes pending Air Corps adoption of the type. Once declared operational the YB-17 was redesignated as the B-17A. Ten more with detail improvements, designated B-17B, were ordered in 1937 with the intention of establishing two heavy bombardment groups, one on each US coast. In July 1940 an additional 512 B-17s were ordered and by 7 December 1941 there were some 200 in USAAF service.

As to be expected with such a technologically advanced aircraft, the early B-17s exhibited various teething troubles. Twenty B-17Cs were provided to the RAF via Lend-Lease but due to inadequate crew training, maintenance problems, and design flaws they proved disappointing in service. One major weak spot was the defensive armament. None of the B-17C’s five machine guns were mounted in power-operated turrets, they were prone to jamming, and there was no tail gun. Fortunately, however, Boeing had been at work on a major redesign, and this became the B-17E. It had a new tail assembly for improved flight stability, a tail turret with twin caliber .50 machine guns, power-operated dorsal and ventral turrets with the same armament, and numerous other improvements. The B-17E was the first mass-produced version of the Flying Fortress. Over 500 were built and it was followed by the B-17F with further improvements. Between mid-1942 and late 1943, these two models equipped most of the USAAF heavy bombardment groups in the UK.

Pinpoint bombing performance was to be assured by the top-secret Norden Mk. XV tachometric bombsight. The Norden employed an analog computer that recalculated the bomb impact point based on changing flight conditions, coupled to an autopilot that that made rapid and accurate course corrections. Together, these features promised unprecedented accuracy for daytime bombing from high altitudes. In prewar tests the Norden achieved a circular error probable (CEP) of 75 feet, meaning that it could place bombs within a circle of that diameter. The Air Corps believed that the Norden would enable heavy bombers to make precision attacks on such targets as ships and factories from high altitude.
 

Major General Carl Spaatz (left), commanding Eighth Air Force, and Brigadier General Ira Eaker, commanding VIII Bomber Command (US War Department)

The USAAF formation that would conduct the strategic air offensive against Germany, the storied Eighth Air Force, was activated on 28 January 1942 at Savannah Army Air Base, Georgia. The Eighth was not originally earmarked for Britain; it was to be the air component of Operation GYMNAST, the proposed invasion of North Africa. When this was postponed (later to be revived as TORCH in November 1942), it was decided that the Eighth would go to Britain instead. There, the groundwork for a major deployment of American airpower was being laid by Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, the commander-designate of VIII Bomber Command. He and a small staff had arrived in Britain on 8 February 1942 and immediately set about the gargantuan task of creating the infrastructure necessary to support a strategic air force.

In this the Americans were greatly assisted by the RAF. The cooperation between the allied air forces is one of the outstanding success stories of World War II, and in those early days the RAF was unstinting in its support of the fledgling American effort. Eaker established excellent relations with Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of the Air Staff, and with Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command. They saw to it that the Americans were provided with everything from billets and rations to clerical, maintenance and communications support pending the establishment of the USAAF logistical base. To prepare for the reception of the Eighth Air Force, 127 airfields, either already in existence or to be constructed, were identified. Seventy-five of these were earmarked for the Eighth’s heavy bombardment groups.
 

Distinguishing Flag of the Eighth Air Force

The group, consisting of a headquarters squadron and three flying squadrons with eight, later twelve, aircraft each was the USAAF’s basic unit. In Britain, each heavy bombardment group would be allotted a primary and a satellite airfield. Sixty-six of these were to be ready by March 1943. For the initial American deployment, eight airfields already under construction for the RAF were made available.

While these preparations in Britain were underway, the Eighth Air Force was being reorganized for its new mission and prepared for deployment. This was the responsibility of Major General Carl Spaatz, the commander of the Eighth since 5 May 1942. The Eighth’s major subordinate units were VIII Bomber Command, VIII Fighter Command, VIII Composite Command (responsible for training) and VIII Service Command (responsible for logistics). A large number of combat units were listed for future assignment to the Eighth, but initially it had only the 1st and 31st Pursuit Groups, the 97th Bombardment Group (Heavy) and the separate 5th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. Later two more pursuit groups—by then redesignated as fighter groups—and two more heavy bombardment groups were added.
 

Early production P-38 fighters like these equipped two of the Eighth Air Force's four initial fighter groups (US Air Force History & Museums Program)

The ground echelon of the Eighth moved to Britain mostly by sea, but the aircraft themselves flew directly from the US. There were three routes, all originating from Presque Isle, Maine, with intermediate stops at Goose Bay, Labrador, Gander, Newfoundland, Greenland or Iceland. Despite the perils of such long flights, especially for fighter aircraft, the movement was completed successfully with only 5% losses—half what had been forecast. By August 1942 386 aircraft—164 P-38s, 119 B-17s, and 103 C-47s—had arrived in Britain. Only the two fighter groups equipped with P-39s did not fly their aircraft across the Atlantic; such a flight was considered too dangerous for the single-engine Airacobra. Instead, the two groups were provisionally equipped with Spitfires upon their arrival in Britain.

So the Americans arrived: in small numbers initially, and it would be some time before the first units were ready for combat. Aircrew required additional training and familiarization with European conditions, the Eighth Air Force’s ground organization had to be perfected, there were thousands of details, from high priority to trivial, that demanded attention. This was the work done by General Eaker and his staff between February and August of 1942, and it set the stage for the assembly of a mighty aerial host.

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